注:本文內容主要摘錄自美國知乎quora上相關(guān)的發(fā)言，并非我自己的看法，分享到這里為大家提供一個(gè)借鑒參考。
正文如下：
“卡脖子”的表述很形象，借用到核心技術(shù)中來(lái)，那就說(shuō)明這項技術(shù)非常關(guān)鍵，在一個(gè)項目或一個(gè)產(chǎn)品中，“卡脖子”技術(shù)的重要性不言而喻。我們常用的電腦核心芯片、高端手機核心芯片、存儲設備、視頻系統中顯示驅動(dòng)芯片、數字信號處理設備芯片，及可編程邏輯設備核心芯片等，都是中國自己造不出來(lái)的高端芯片，幾乎完全依賴(lài)進(jìn)口，在這些產(chǎn)品中，中國自產(chǎn)芯片在全球的市場(chǎng)占有率連1%都不到，甚至絕大部分低于0.5%。
這樣的現狀下，高端芯片自然就成了“卡脖子”問(wèn)題，原因是極大的需求量和極低的自供給量，所以美國制裁華為，殺手锏就是芯片。近期在美版知乎論壇上就有這樣的一個(gè)話(huà)題引起各國網(wǎng)友的熱議：“美國向荷蘭施壓，阻止荷蘭ASML公司向中芯國際出售EUV設備，最終影響了中國的技術(shù)夢(mèng)”。美國能壓制中國芯片發(fā)展多久?
讓我們也來(lái)看看國外民間網(wǎng)友對這個(gè)問(wèn)題的的觀(guān)點(diǎn)吧！
話(huà)題內容
荷蘭半導體工程師的觀(guān)點(diǎn)
I think I am the perfect person to answer this. I have been working in the semiconductor industry for years, currently living in the Netherlands, lived and worked in China for 3 years, I know a lot of engineers from ASML (expecially after they hired hundreds of Turkish engineers).
我認為我是回答這個(gè)問(wèn)題的最佳人選。我在半導體行業(yè)工作多年，目前生活在荷蘭，在中國生活和工作了3年，我認識很多來(lái)自ASML的工程師(特別是他們雇傭了數百名土耳其工程師后)。
Let me tell you something: High-end semiconductor manufacturing is black magic. Both the processes and tools used for it are very complex. ASML’s EUV lithography machine is probably the most complex tool humankind ever developed since it stopped jumping between trees. It took billions of Euros and decades of experience to perfect it. Other experienced lithography machine suppliers failed at it. China has no experience in high-end semiconductor manufacturing tools with the exception of one-off/few-off prototypes.
讓我告訴你：高端半導體制造是一種黑魔法。它所使用的過(guò)程和工具都非常復雜。ASML的EUV光刻機可能是人類(lèi)發(fā)明的最復雜的工具，因為它不再在樹(shù)之間跳躍。它花費了數十億歐元和幾十年的經(jīng)驗來(lái)完善它。其他經(jīng)驗豐富的光刻機供應商在這方面失敗了。中國在高端半導體制造工具方面沒(méi)有經(jīng)驗，除了一次性或少量的原型。
ASML’s EUV lithography machine. Needs 41 semi-trucks to get transported, costs $150 million, has 100.000 major parts, has mirrors that need months of grinding to reach needed smoothness, needs multiple people with PhD’s as machine operators. Quite high-tech. Isn’t it?
ASML公司的EUV光刻機。運輸需要41輛半卡車(chē)，耗資1.5億美元，有10萬(wàn)個(gè)主要部件，鏡子需要數月的打磨才能達到所需的光滑程度，需要多名擁有博士學(xué)位的人作為機器操作員。很高科技。不是嗎?
EUV光刻機
Unfortunately, ASML is a very convenient target for the USA. The company uses a lot of critical parts from the USA but those parts don’t represent anything significant in the US economy in terms of their monetary value. Chinese electronics industry still depends on foreign chips so it can not threaten fabs with banning the sale of chips in China that were manufactured using ASML tools. Also, China isn’t a big customer of ASML too. In short, China can not answer with reciprocal sanctions.
不幸的是，ASML對美國來(lái)說(shuō)是一個(gè)非常方便的目標。該公司使用了許多來(lái)自美國的關(guān)鍵部件，但這些部件的貨幣價(jià)值在美國經(jīng)濟中并不代表任何重要的東西。中國電子行業(yè)仍依賴(lài)外國芯片，因此無(wú)法通過(guò)禁止在中國銷(xiāo)售使用ASML工具生產(chǎn)的芯片來(lái)威脅晶片廠(chǎng)。此外，中國也不是阿斯麥的大客戶(hù)?？傊?，中國不能以對等制裁作為回應。
Is China hopeless? No.
中國絕望了? 不！
1- All of those tools are engineered and made by humans, and the laws of physics are the same both in the Netherlands and China. If the Netherlands could, then there is no reason for anybody else to fail with the correct approach.
1-所有這些工具都是由人類(lèi)設計和制造的，而且物理定律在荷蘭和中國都是相同的。如果荷蘭可以，那么其他國家就沒(méi)有理由用正確的方法失敗。
2- China is filthy rich compared to the Netherlands. Chinese economy is 17x of the Netherlands’, 9x of SK’s, 27x of Taiwan’s, 3+x of Japan’s. With state support, Chinese fabs and tool makers can hire the top people from the rest of the world with salaries ASML, LamResearch, AM, Synopsys, TSMC, Samsung, … simply can not compete with. A significant portion of these companies’ employees are expats anyway, most of them are just after money.
2、中國比荷蘭富得流油。中國經(jīng)濟是荷蘭的17倍，SK的9倍，中國臺灣地區的27倍，日本的3倍。在國家的支持下，中國的晶圓廠(chǎng)和工具制造商可以用ASML、LamResearch、AM、Synopsys、臺積電、三星等公司無(wú)法與之競爭的薪水從世界其他地方雇傭頂尖人才。這些公司的員工中有很大一部分是外國人，他們中的大多數只是為了錢(qián)。
In fact China is already doing this successfully with good results. For example, it already has a working EUV lithography machine prototype, already caught up with the rest in chip testing, packaging, wafer production, also its first immersion lithography machine (good enough for most things) is getting prepared for commercial use.
事實(shí)上，中國已經(jīng)成功地做到了這一點(diǎn)，并取得了良好的成果。例如，它已經(jīng)有了一臺工作中的EUV光刻機原型，在芯片測試、封裝、晶圓生產(chǎn)方面已經(jīng)趕上了其他公司，同時(shí)它的第一臺浸沒(méi)式光刻機(對大多數事情來(lái)說(shuō)已經(jīng)足夠好了)也準備投入商業(yè)使用。
3- China is a scientific powerhouse on its own. It is the country with most patent applications, most research output, graduates more STEM students than any other country, 2nd largest R&D spender, has 11 universities in top 100. This leads us to my first point. If the Netherlands could, so can China if given enough time.
中國本身就是一個(gè)科學(xué)強國。它是專(zhuān)利申請最多、研究產(chǎn)出最多的國家，STEM專(zhuān)業(yè)的畢業(yè)生比其他任何國家都多，研發(fā)支出排名第二，有11所大學(xué)進(jìn)入前100名。這就引出了我的第一點(diǎn)。如果荷蘭可以，那么只要給中國足夠的時(shí)間，中國也可以。
4- Catching up is much easier than innovating. Knowing something is possible and having a general knowledge of how it works make things much easier.
趕超比創(chuàng )新容易得多。知道某件事是可能的，并且對它的工作原理有一個(gè)大致的了解會(huì )讓事情變得容易得多。
5- Time is on the Chinese side. Technology of semiconductors is close to maturity/stalling (choose the word depending on your view). If the development slows (which it does) it gives China the opportunity to catch-up. If a tech revolution happens, then the playing field evens out anyway.
5-時(shí)間在中國這邊。半導體技術(shù)接近成熟/停滯(根據你的觀(guān)點(diǎn)選擇這個(gè)詞)。如果發(fā)展放緩(確實(shí)如此)，中國就有機會(huì )迎頭趕上。如果科技革命發(fā)生了，那么競爭環(huán)境無(wú)論如何都是公平的。
6- You don’t need EUV for the most things. You don’t even need high-end processes for the most things. There is more to semiconductors than the latest smartphone processors, GPUs, and CPUs. Look at iPhone 12 teardown videos. You will see a lot of chips. Only one of them needs EUV. An average modern car has 250+ computers inside. That means thousands of chips. All of them are manufactured using old processes. This is even more true for military and space applications. Those use very old chips that are known to be reliable and secure.
6-大多數事情都不需要EUV。大多數事情你甚至不需要高端的流程。半導體不僅僅是最新的智能手機處理器、圖形處理器(gpu)和cpu?？纯磇Phone 12拆卸的視頻。你會(huì )看到很多芯片。只有一個(gè)需要EUV。一輛普通的現代汽車(chē)內部有250臺電腦。這意味著(zhù)成千上萬(wàn)的芯片。所有這些都是用舊工藝制造的。在軍事和太空應用方面更是如此。它們使用的是非常老舊的芯片，但已知是可靠和安全的。
Conclusion: Blocking ASML from selling EUV machines to China can hurt Chinese businesses for some time but in the grand scheme it is insignificant. The USA needs to run faster rather than keep trying to block China if it wants to preserve its dominance in tech.
結論：阻止ASML向中國銷(xiāo)售EUV設備可能會(huì )在一段時(shí)間內傷害中國企業(yè)，但從長(cháng)遠來(lái)看，這是微不足道的。如果美國想要保持其在科技領(lǐng)域的主導地位，它需要跑得更快，而不是一直試圖阻止中國。
An update on the Chinese EUV light source: New Options for Synchrotron Light Sources
中國極紫外光源的更新：同步加速器光源的新選擇
It seems the basic research is complete and the method completely different than of ASML’s.
看來(lái)基礎研究已經(jīng)完成，方法和ASML的完全不同。
德國網(wǎng)友的觀(guān)點(diǎn)
This EUV thing has been adopted into China’s 14th 5-year plan which has been started since this year. And for the record, China has never missed a single deadline for the past 13 5-year plans. So it’s safe to say that China will have this thing by 2026. So speaking of the US resisting China’s development, it would be 4 more years for this particular item.
EUV項目已被納入今年啟動(dòng)的中國第14個(gè)五年計劃。根據記錄，在過(guò)去的13個(gè)五年計劃中，中國從未錯過(guò)任何一個(gè)最后期限。所以可以肯定地說(shuō)，中國將在2026年擁有它。所以說(shuō)到美國抵制中國的發(fā)展，這個(gè)項目還需要4年。
And the good thing for China having the EUV equipment is that the price of the equipment will be significantly dropped. So I guess that would be a benefit of the entire world.
中國擁有EUV設備的好處是，設備的價(jià)格將大幅下降。所以我想這對整個(gè)世界都有好處。
America is ALREADY behind China in so MANY aspects and they are still denying and avoiding the thought that America might one day second to China. That frightens many Americans.
美國在很多方面已經(jīng)落后于中國了，他們還在否認和避免美國有一天會(huì )落后于中國的想法。這讓許多美國人感到害怕。
No matter how ineffective many of the counter-China measures, e.g. trade war, Americans have and are to put in place, they will keep doing the same things and getting themselves hurt before China does.
無(wú)論許多繁華措施有多無(wú)效，例如貿易戰，美國人已經(jīng)并將付諸實(shí)施，他們將繼續做同樣的事情，他們會(huì )主動(dòng)出擊而不是等待中國超越他們。
The Chinese are the most industrious race on earth.
中國人是世界上最勤勞的民族。
Necessity is the mother of Invention.
需求是發(fā)明之母
The Chinese will find a way. The more you suppress them and the more you try to deny them the technology - they will begin to make it on their own and they will slowly do better and better.
中國人會(huì )找到辦法的。你越是壓制他們，你越是試圖否認他們的技術(shù)，他們就會(huì )開(kāi)始自己創(chuàng )造，慢慢地做得越來(lái)越好。
Chips is the best example.
芯片就是最好的例子。
As long as Taiwan kept supplying them the chips - The Chinese were happy. They focused on other things
只要臺積電繼續向他們供應芯片——中國人就很高興。然后會(huì )他們專(zhuān)注于其他事情。
江蘇南京的臺積電工廠(chǎng)
The Minute Trump decided to threaten the Chinese - they decided to get their act together and start making their own chips. They will start with inferior ones but in 10 years - they will outmanufacture Taiwan at 1/3 the cost and take away the market.
特朗普決定威脅他們那一刻起，他們就會(huì )齊心協(xié)力開(kāi)始制作自己的芯片。他們一開(kāi)始會(huì )用劣質(zhì)產(chǎn)品，但10年后，他們的生產(chǎn)成本將是臺積電的三分之一，并奪走市場(chǎng)。
The US may try again and again but
美國人可能會(huì )一次又一次地嘗試，但是：
(a) They waited too long. China is too rich today. They have too much money.
他們會(huì )等得很久。今天的中國太富裕了。他們有太多的錢(qián)。
(b) China has too many tentacles in foreign countries. Thousands of Chinese in various industries who are experts.
中國在國外涉及的領(lǐng)域太多。數以千計的華人專(zhuān)家分布在各行各業(yè)。
In Space alone - China was behind India until 2010 - but today - they have their own Mapping System for their huge landmass as well as are in the position of becoming the Third country in the globe to land on Mars - having landed on the moon.
僅在太空方面——中國在2010年之前一直落后于印度（原文如此，譯者注）——但今天——他們擁有自己的龐大陸地測繪系統，并處于成為全球第三個(gè)登陸火星的國家的位置——已經(jīng)登陸了月球。
China and Russia are on the verge of building their own International Space Station having both the financial muscle and technology.
中國和俄羅斯即將建立自己的國際空間站，他們既有財力又有技術(shù)。
You cannot bully or intimidate or stifle Progress. Eventually Life finds a way.
你們不能靠欺凌、恐嚇或扼殺進(jìn)步。最終，生活找到了一條路。
US should learn this lesson hard. The more they try - they may get 10 years more but in the end China will get there and take over.
美國應該好好吸取教訓。他們嘗試得越多——他們可能最晚在十年內達到同等的技術(shù)并接管整個(gè)市場(chǎng)。
It might be quite awhile, but there are many variables that’s in play.
這可能需要一段時(shí)間，但有很多變數在發(fā)揮作用。
It should be noted that NO country at this point can produce the ASML EUV equipment on its own (or even the older generation DUV is questionable), ASML relies heavily on suppliers from Germany / UK / US / Japan etc as well to make their equipment, Japan might be the closest country that can produce a similar (but older generation) equipment relying only on company / tech inside their border.
需要注意的是，目前沒(méi)有哪個(gè)國家可以自己生產(chǎn)ASML的EUV設備(甚至老一代的DUV也值得懷疑)，ASML嚴重依賴(lài)德國/英國/美國/日本等國的供應商來(lái)生產(chǎn)他們的設備，日本可能是最接近能夠生產(chǎn)類(lèi)似(但老一代)設備的國家，只依賴(lài)本國的公司/技術(shù)。
As of right now the ASML not selling highest-end EUV to China isn’t even really a thing, because they can’t produce enough of them anyway, and the whole project managed to get off the ground because Intel / TSMC / Samsung funded the project SPECIFICALLY so that ASML only really sells to them that machine. it’s not just SMIC of China that can’t buy it, even global foundery of the world can’t either.
就目前而言，ASML不向中國銷(xiāo)售最高規格的EUV還算不上什么，因為他們無(wú)論如何都無(wú)法生產(chǎn)足夠多的EUV，而且整個(gè)項目成功地啟動(dòng)了，因為英特爾/臺積電/三星專(zhuān)門(mén)資助了這個(gè)項目，所以ASML只向他們出售那臺機器。不只是中國的中芯國際買(mǎi)不到它，就連全球鑄造廠(chǎng)也買(mǎi)不到。
There are many layers of problems to China building it’s own extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, but the most difficult is the fact that EUV and the way TSMC & Samsung uses them are the extreme edge of precision engineering and manufacturing. something China has never been particularly great at, for example, they still struggle so far to build their own internal combustion engines to the same level as Japan / Germany (the two key powerhouse players in doing such things.)
中國制造自己的極紫外光刻機存在許多層面的問(wèn)題，但最困難的是EUV以及臺積電和三星使用它們的方式是精密工程和制造的極端優(yōu)勢。中國在這方面從來(lái)都不是特別擅長(cháng)，例如，到目前為止，他們仍然在努力制造與日本/德國(這兩個(gè)關(guān)鍵的大國在做這類(lèi)事情)相同的內燃機。
There are certainly potential ways for China to reengineer the process and come up with something that has a relatively similar end result but relies on different technologies, however that would require them to completely reinvent the wheel of something that was basically the collaboration of the whole world over decades on their own. Again, that’s not IMPOSSIBLE, but it’s certainly extremely difficult and inefficient.
中國當然有可能重新設計這一過(guò)程，并提出一些具有相對相似的最終結果，但依賴(lài)不同技術(shù)的東西，但這將需要他們完全重新發(fā)明輪子的東西，這基本上是整個(gè)世界在幾十年的合作，靠自己。同樣，這不是不可能的，但這肯定是極其困難和低效的。
Not to mention that this is not a purely scientific / engineering project, the difference with TSMC winning over other competitors is primarily COST. i.e that it’s not that Intel CAN’T do 7nm, they can, it’s that their failure rate is much higher than TSMC that if say, Apple relies only on Intel for their 7nm chip, they’ll have to sell their iphone at a much higher price and/or one of Intel or Apple (or both) go bankrupt.
且不說(shuō)這不是一個(gè)純粹的科學(xué)/工程項目，臺積電與其他競爭對手的區別主要在于成本。也就是說(shuō)，不是英特爾不能做7nm，而是他們可以，而是他們的失敗率比臺積電高得多，如果蘋(píng)果只依賴(lài)英特爾做他們的7nm芯片，他們將不得不以更高的價(jià)格出售他們的iphone和/或英特爾或蘋(píng)果(或兩者)之一破產(chǎn)。
So even if China COULD reverse engineer or re-engineer the EUV machine or subsititute, if it doesn’t actually win out on a cost basis it’s basically useless commercially, an insanely expensive academic project (we’re talking about NASA level funding.) most importantly, the US could simply shut out said machine using standards, and for local chinese companies like SMIC to adapt a different system would be extremely problematic.
因此，即使中國可以對EUV機器進(jìn)行逆向工程或重新設計或替代，如果它在成本上沒(méi)有真正贏(yíng)得勝利，它在商業(yè)上基本上是無(wú)用的，一個(gè)瘋狂昂貴的學(xué)術(shù)項目(我們說(shuō)的是NASA水平的資金。)最重要的是，美國可以簡(jiǎn)單地排除使用標準的機器，而對中國本土公司，如中芯國際適應一個(gè)不同的系統將是非常有問(wèn)題的。
Is it POSSIBLE if China just like nationalize SMIC and stuff? yeah, but it would in the grander scheme of things, be pretty close to cutting off your own nose to spit your enemy. China would effectively be abandoning the world market for decades in such a scenario. and probably move slower than their competitors.
如果中國把中芯國際國有化，可能嗎?沒(méi)錯，但從更大的角度來(lái)說(shuō)，這就像是割下自己的鼻子來(lái)唾棄你的敵人。在這種情況下，中國實(shí)際上是在幾十年內放棄世界市場(chǎng)。而且可能比他們的競爭對手行動(dòng)更慢。
What China SHOULD do, is what they have been doing most of the time (some major exceptions of terrible mistakes and frauds non-withstanding.) which is to try and gradually move up the chain and establish more and more companies in this field and hope that some of them eventually hold a major niche that becomes almost indispensable in this field. I’d say that most of the actual workers / players in this field in China understands this and is more or less trying to do that.
中國應該做的，是他們在大多數時(shí)候一直在做的(盡管存在一些嚴重的錯誤和欺詐)，那就是嘗試并逐步向上移動(dòng)鏈條，在這個(gè)領(lǐng)域建立越來(lái)越多的公司，并希望其中一些公司最終在這個(gè)領(lǐng)域占據一個(gè)幾乎不可或缺的主要利基。我想說(shuō)的是，中國這個(gè)領(lǐng)域的大多數實(shí)際工作者/參與者都明白這一點(diǎn)，并或多或少地試圖這樣做。
But just to remind people, semi conductor’s main raw material input is Silicon
但提醒大家一下，半導體的主要原材料是硅。
So just to give an idea what shutting out China REALLY looks like.
所以，讓我們看看把中國拒之門(mén)外到底是什么樣子。
Now that’s the part on why it’s a major problem for China, the other side of the coin is that the US is increasingly playing a dangerous game as well and could blow up its own advantages or worse.
這就是為什么它是中國的一個(gè)主要問(wèn)題，硬幣的另一面是，美國也在越來(lái)越多地玩一個(gè)危險的游戲，可能會(huì )摧毀自己的優(yōu)勢，甚至更糟。
If you’re ASML and the EU in general, you’re not exactly thrilled to basically have the US policy forced upon you as well. and would probably now actively think about having replacement tech for the US/UK stuff if possible so that you have at least political and economic independence (i.e even if they don’t sell to China, it’s on their terms and not because the US commanded them to do so.) and once that happens the next potential moves by US and others could become quite scary.
如果你是ASML和歐盟，你不會(huì )因為美國的政策強加給你而感到興奮。如果可能的話(huà)，現在可能會(huì )積極考慮擁有替代美國/英國產(chǎn)品的技術(shù)，這樣你至少有政治和經(jīng)濟獨立(也就是說(shuō)，即使他們不賣(mài)給中國，這是根據他們的條件，而不是因為美國命令他們這么做)，一旦發(fā)生這種情況，美國和其他國家的下一個(gè)潛在舉動(dòng)可能會(huì )變得非?？膳?。
It should be generally noted that the EU and other US allies is actually paying almost all the price for the trade war/ geopolitical struggle with China / Russia while the US is benefitting at their expense.
需要指出的是，歐盟和美國的其他盟友實(shí)際上為與中國/俄羅斯的貿易付出了幾乎所有的代價(jià)，而美國卻從他們的損失中受益。
So far if one look at the score board it’s pretty much the US wins and everyone else (friend or foe) loses with a few small exceptions.
到目前為止，如果你看一下記分牌，基本上美國贏(yíng)麻了，其他所有人(朋友或敵人)都輸了，只有一些小的例外。
This is clearly unsustainable over the long term, and it’s not like this is just happening as a new thing, the general trend has been on-going since at least the early 2000s and not only have the likes of China and Russia been making obvious contingency plans, one would be naive to think that the EU is just a pure puppet with no independent thought or interest apart from the US.
從長(cháng)期來(lái)看，這顯然是不可持續的，這并不是一件新鮮事，至少從21世紀初開(kāi)始，這種大趨勢就一直在持續，不僅中國和俄羅斯等國一直在制定明顯的應急計劃，人們會(huì )天真地認為歐盟只是一個(gè)純粹的傀儡，除了美國之外沒(méi)有獨立的思想或利益。
轉自汽車(chē)電子與軟件
